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Summary 
The Swedish Government introduced the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules as it was identified that the preferential tax treatment of debt 
in comparison to equity had been used by Multi-National Enterprises for tax 
planning purposes. The Swedish rules have, however, been under 
investigation of the European Commission, which, in a letter of formal 
notice to the Swedish Government, has stated that the rules are incompatible 
with the fundamental freedoms of EU law. The purpose of the thesis is, 
thus, to analyse to what extent Member States can have anti-avoidance rules 
limiting interest deduction and more specifically whether the Swedish rules 
are compatible with the fundamental freedoms of EU law. Other 
international obligations of Sweden such as State aid, secondary EU law and 
tax treaties have not been regarded. 
Applying the legal dogmatic research method it has been shown that the 
Swedish interest deduction limitation rules apply to affiliated companies i.e. 
where a company has substantial influence in another company or if the 
companies are mainly under the same management. The main rules are that 
interest expenses are not deductible between affiliated companies or for 
back-to-back loans, which are used for the acquisition of shares in an 
affiliated company or a company that will become affiliated after the 
acquisition. There are some exceptions to this, according to which deduction 
of interest expenses is allowed if the beneficial owner of the interest income 
would have been taxed with at least a 10 % tax rate, following the 
hypothetical test. Deduction of interest expenses, however, can be denied, 
even though the interest income is taxed with at least 10 %, if the main 
reason for the debt arrangement is that the affiliated companies are to obtain 
a substantial tax advantage. Deduction is, further, allowed, even though the 
interest income is taxed with a tax rate below 10 %, if the transaction is 
mainly business motivated. There are specific rules for pension funds. 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are to be examined with the 
freedom of establishment as definite influence is a prerequisite for the 
application of the rules. Even though the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules apply regardless of nationality and residency of the taxpayer 
are the rules to be considered indirectly discriminatory. The Swedish rules 
are more likely to apply to cross-border situations than to Swedish wholly 
internal situations, as the Swedish tax rate is 22 %. It is also, in the 
preworks, stated that the aim of the rules is to prevent evasion of the 
Swedish tax base. The Swedish rules cannot be justified by the cohesion of 
the tax system or the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing rights 
between Member States due to lack of symmetry but the prevention of tax 
avoidance can justify the rules since wholly artificial arrangements are 
restricted. The Swedish rules are, however, not proportionate since the rules 
have a wider scope of application than to only wholly artificial 
arrangements, have a presumption of tax avoidance and are not in line with 
the principle of legal certainty. The Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules are, thus, incompatible with the freedom of establishment.
 III 
Abbreviation list 
Art.      Article 
CFC      Controlled Foreign Company 
Ch.      Chapter 
ECJ      European Court of Justice 
EU      European Union 
MNE      Multi-National Enterprise 
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operation and Development 
P.      Page 
Para.      Paragraph 
Paras.      Paragraphs 
Prop. Proposition 
SITA      Swedish Income Tax Act 
TEU      Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union 
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Vol. Volume
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1.   Introduction 
1.1 Background 
There are general differences in tax treatment between debt and equity on a 
national and an international level, creating a lack of neutrality between the 
financing forms. Return on equity i.e. dividends are generally not deductible 
for the distributor and, as a relief of economic double taxation, not taxed in 
the hands of the receiver. Return on debt i.e. interest, however, is generally 
deductible for the borrower and taxed in the hands of the lender. On an 
international level are dividends often taxed in the source State of the 
investment while interest is often taxed in the resident State of the lender. 
Withholding taxes are, in addition, often lower for interest than for 
dividends. This lack of neutrality between dividends and interest for tax 
purposes has created an incentive for businesses to use debt as financing 
form, instead of equity.1 
The preferential tax treatment of interest has been used by Multi-National 
Enterprises (MNEs) to shift profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax 
jurisdictions through debt financing and subsequent interest payments, as 
pointed out by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) 
discussion.2 The BEPS issue with the use of interest was identified in 
Sweden in the so-called “industrivärden-målen” where the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the Swedish General Anti 
Avoidance Rule (GAAR) is not applicable on structures where interest 
payments and group contribution payments are combined in order to 
achieve low or non-taxation in international groups.3 Sweden, subsequently, 
introduced Specific Anti Avoidance Rules (SAARs) in the form of interest 
deduction limitation rules in order to prevent the loss of tax revenue through 
such and similar structures.4 
The hierarchical solution to the legal pluralism of European Union (EU) law 
and the national laws of the Member States creates an obligation on the 
Member States to comply with EU law, even though direct taxation is part 
                                                
1 Organisation for Economic Co-opoeration and Development (OECD) (2014), Public 
Discussion Draft: BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, 
OECD Publishing, page (p.) 6; OECD (2013), Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
OECD Publishing, p. 43; Storck, A., The Financing of Multinational Companies and 
Taxes: An Overview of the Issues and Suggestions for Solutions and Improvements, 
Bulletin for International Taxation, Volume (Vol.) 65 number (no.) 1, 2011, p. 27 et seq.; 
and van Dongen, T.J.C., Thin Capitalization Legislation and the EU Corporate Tax 
Directives, European Taxation, Vol. 52 no. 1, 2012, p. 20. 
2 OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, p. 16 
et seq.; OECD (n 1), 2014, p. 6; OECD (n 1), 2013, p. 43; Vleggeert, J., Interest 
Deductions Based on the Allocation of Worldwide Debt, Bulletin for International Taxation, 
Vol. 68 no. 2, 2014, p. 103 et seq.; Storck (n 1), 2011, p. 27 et seq.; and van Dongen (n 1), 
2012, p. 20. 
3 RÅ 2007 ref. 84; and RÅ 2007 ref. 85. The cases were decided on the basis of the 
judgment in RÅ 2001 ref. 79, which had similar circumstances. 
4 Chapter (ch). 24, article (art.) 10a-f, Swedish Income Tax Act (1999:1229) (SITA). 
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of their national sovereignty.5 Consequently, even though it may be 
tempting for Member States to draft national anti-avoidance rules in order to 
hinder the loss of tax revenue, the rules cannot constitute an unjustified 
restriction on the free movements within the EU.6 The Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules must, thus, be in line with the rule-of-reason 
doctrine created by the ECJ.7 The ECJ case law regarding national anti-
avoidance rules include national thin capitalization rules and interest 
deduction limitation rules where conditions have been set up for such rules 
to be compatible with EU law.8 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules have been subject to the 
European Commission´s investigation since the beginning of 2013 and 
several letters have been exchanged between the European Commission and 
the Swedish Government.9 The European Commission sent a letter of 
formal notice to the Swedish Government in late 2014 where it was stated 
that the Swedish rules are incompatible with the fundamental freedoms of 
EU law.10 The Swedish Government has responded to the letter of formal 
notice and presented its view, contrary to the European Commissions, that 
the rules are compatible with the fundamental freedoms of EU law.11 It can 
be expected that the European Commission will send a reasoned opinion to 
the Swedish Government with a time period in which the Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules must comply with EU law and, if this is not 
successfully accomplished, the European Commission will, most likely, 
refer the case to the ECJ.12 
1.2 Aim 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse to what extent Member States of the EU 
can have anti-avoidance rules limiting interest deduction. The focus of the 
thesis is on the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules and whether the 
named rules are compatible with the fundamental freedoms of EU law. The 
analysis consists of a determination of the applicable fundamental freedom 
and whether the Swedish rules are discriminatory, restrictive, justified by an 
overriding reason in the public interest and proportionate. 
1.3 Method and material 
The leading question of the thesis is legal dogmatic as it is to be analysed 
whether there is a conflict between two different legal sources. It is, 
therefore, logical to use the legal dogmatic research method for the purposes 
of the thesis. The legal dogmatic research method means that research is 
                                                
5 C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos; C-6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L; C-35/98 Verkooijen, paragraph 
(para.) 32; C-319/02 Manninen, para. 19; and C-190/12 Emerging Markets Series, para. 38. 
6 See for example 270/83 Commission v France (Avoir Fiscal). 
7 C-55/94 Gebhard, para. 37. 
8 See for example C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst; C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap 
Group Litigation; and C-282/12 Itelcar. 
9 EU Pilot 4437/13/TAXU – Sweden, 09/01/2013. 
10 SG-Greffe (2014) D/17633, case no. 2013/4206, 24 November 2014. 
11 Answers by the Swedish Government to the European Commission, dnr. Fi2013/153; and 
dnr. Fi2014/4205. 
12 See Art. 258 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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conducted of the current law as it is laid down in written and unwritten 
sources of law.13 This is conducted in a two-part process where the sources 
of law are identified and then interpreted, analysed, systemised and 
confronted with each other.14 
For the purposes of explaining the Swedish rules are Swedish legislation, 
Swedish preworks, Swedish case law (including rulings by the Swedish 
Council of Advance Tax Rulings) and literature in the form of opinions of 
the Swedish Tax Agency, books and articles used. The sources of law are 
used in a hierarchy as listed. The explanation is given for the purpose of 
making the reader aware of the Swedish rules as they stand and prepare the 
reader for the upcoming analysis. As the Swedish rules are explained in 
English there is a risk of language discrepancies. Key words are, therefore, 
followed by a Swedish translation in order to limit the possible negative 
effects of the translation. 
When analysing whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are 
compatible with the fundamental freedoms of EU law are the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), ECJ case law, official publications by the European 
Commission, opinions by the Swedish Government, Swedish case law and 
Dutch case law used. The TEU, TFEU and ECJ case law are used when 
identifying the relevant EU law on the matter and in the compatibility 
analysis. The official publications by the European Commission, opinions 
by the Swedish Government, Swedish case law and Dutch case law are used 
for the purpose of informing the reader and give the reader perspective as to 
what the European Commission and the Swedish Government have for 
opinion and how national Courts have ruled on the matter. 
1.4 Delimitations 
Only the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules will be explained and 
analysed in the thesis. Other thin capitalization rules or interest deduction 
limitation rules in other jurisdictions will not be covered. The thesis is 
limited to the Swedish rules since the rules in question are subject to 
investigation by the European Commission. 
The thesis is, further, limited to the fundamental freedoms of EU law. The 
thesis will not cover other aspects of EU law such as State aid15, the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive16 or the Interest-Royalty Directive17. An analysis of the 
compatibility of a domestic rule with EU law is, logically, initialled with 
primary law and then, if compatibility is found, continued with secondary 
                                                
13 Vranken, J., Exciting times for Legal Scholarship, Bju Tijdschriften, February 2012, p. 
43. Source found via Douma, S., Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law, 
Kluwer, 2014, p. 18. 
14 Douma (n 15), 2014, p. 20. 
15 Art. 107-109 TFEU. 
16 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation 
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiares of different Member States, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 345/8, 29 December 2011. 
17 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation 
applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different 
Member States, Official Journal of the European Union, L 157/49, 26 June 2003. 
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law. State aid is part of EU primary law but, as the European Commission 
has limited its investigation of the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules to the fundamental freedoms of EU law, it will not be part of the 
thesis. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest-Royalty Directive 
are considered as secondary law and are to be examined after primary law, 
e.g. the fundamental freedoms. The Directives are, therefore, not part of the 
analysis for the purposes of the thesis. 
Sweden has an international legal commitment to follow double tax treaties 
concluded with other States and it is, therefore, possible for a conflict to 
arise between on one hand the treaties and on the other hand Swedish 
national law. A conflict can arise since the relationship between the Swedish 
double tax treaties and Swedish national law is an unresolved issue.18 Since, 
however, double tax treaties are not part of EU law, it is not relevant for the 
achievement of the aim of the thesis and it is not covered. 
The thesis is based on research until 10 May 2015 and consideration is, thus, 
only taken to published material up to that date. 
1.5 Outline 
Following the introduction are the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules presented (2), the purpose of which is to inform the reader about which 
companies are covered by the rules (2.1), the first main rule with exceptions 
(2.2) and the second main rule with exceptions (2.3). The thesis proceeds 
with an analysis of whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules 
are compatible with the fundamental freedoms of EU law (3). The analysis 
is initiated with a short introduction (3.1) and proceeds with an investigation 
of which fundamental freedom is applicable on the Swedish rules (3.2), 
whether the rules are discriminatory or restrictive (3.3), justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest (3.4) and proportionate (3.5). The 
analysis is followed by concluding remarks (4).  
                                                
18 RÅ 2008 ref. 24 and RÅ 2008 ref. 61 compared to RÅ 2010 ref. 112. The issue is 
explained in Dahlberg, M., Ränta eller kapitalvinst: Grundproblem i 
kapitalinkomstbeskattningen – särskilt vad gäller finansiella instrument i gränslandet 
mellan lånekapital och eget kapital, Iustus förlag AB, Uppsala, 2011, p. 144 et seq.. 
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2 The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules 
2.1 Companies covered by the rules 
The general rule in the Swedish tax system is that interest is fully deductible 
for businesses.19 The general rule, however, has some exceptions since 
Sweden has introduced anti-avoidance rules with the purpose of combating 
tax avoidance with the use of interest. The present Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules came into force 1 January 2013 and the legal 
consequence is that deduction of interest expenses related to debt between 
affiliated companies is not allowed under certain circumstances.20 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are applicable on affiliated 
companies (“intressegemenskap” in Swedish) and the term has, therefore, a 
central role in the application of the rules. Companies covered by the rules 
are legal persons and Swedish partnerships.21 This means that the 
Government, municipalities and country councils are included in the 
definition.22 Further, foreign companies that correspond to Swedish 
companies are also covered by the rules.23 The same applies to European 
Economic Interest Groupings, European Cooperative Societies and 
European Groupings of Territorial Cooperations.24 
There are two alternative definitions of when companies are considered as 
being affiliated. According to the first definition are companies affiliated if 
a company, directly or indirectly, has substantial influence in another 
company through ownership or in other ways.25 Parent companies and 
subsidiaries are covered by this definition and the formulation “directly or 
indirectly” means that companies that are owned by the parent company 
through its subsidiaries also can be part of the affiliation.26 The meaning of 
substantial influence is not stated in the law but the Swedish Government 
has, in the preworks (“förarbeten” in Swedish) to the rules, explained the 
term to some extent. It is explained that the term substantial influence is a 
customary term that is used in several other tax related contexts in Swedish 
tax law and means that ownership is not the only factor to be considered but 
that an ownership of just below 50 % is covered.27 It can be noted that the 
term substantial influence is, in the preworks to the SITA, explained as 40 
% ownership or more, which can imply that an ownership of as low as 40 % 
can be enough for companies to be considered as affiliated.28 The Swedish 
Tax Agency, however, is of the opinion that factors such as the relationship 
                                                
19 Ch. 16, art. 1, SITA. 
20 An overview of the rules can be found in a commentary by the Swedish Tax Agency 
”Handledning för beskattning av inkomst vid 2014 års taxering”, del 2, Skatteverket, 
Stockholm, 2014, p. 1417-1433. 
21 Ch. 24, art. 10a para. 2, SITA. 
22 Borg, E.P., Kommentarer till Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229), Karnov Internet, 24 
Kapitel 10a§. 
23 Ch. 2, art. 2, SITA. 
24 See ch. 5, art. 2, SITA; ch. 2, art. 4a, SITA; and Dahlberg (n 20), 2011, p. 369. 
25 Ch. 24, art. 10a para. 1 1p, SITA. 
26 Proposition (prop.) 2012/13:1 p. 239 with reference to prop. 2008/09:65 p. 83. 
27 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 239. 
28 Prop. 1999/2000:2 part 1 p. 502 ff; and Borg (n 24), 24 Kapitel 10a§. 
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between the owners and formal and informal ownership agreements are to 
be considered and that an ownership far below 40 %, therefore, can be 
considered as substantial influence.29 The Swedish Tax Agency has in a 
response (“dialogsvar” in Swedish) to a MNE stated that an ownership of 10 
% was enough to be considered as substantial influence in those specific 
circumstances.30 This has been highly criticised in legal articles and the 
detailed percentage of ownership needed in relation to other circumstances 
in a specific case will be unclear until the legislator or the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court explains it further.31 
According to the second definition are companies considered affiliated if the 
companies are mainly under the same management.32 The legal text does not 
give further explanation of the meaning of the definition but guidance can 
be found in various preworks. It is stated that the definition targets groups of 
minority-owned associated companies (“oäkta koncerner” in Swedish) 
where for example two unrelated parties are under control of a third party or 
where a parent company has control of its subsidiary (the definition overlaps 
with the previously explained definition).33 It is the actual influence and not 
the formal influence that is decisive.34 Regarding the term “mainly” it is 
stated that it is a quantative requirement of at least 75 %.35 An example is if 
the companies have the same board of directors.36 As with the requirement 
of substantial influence will the requirement of companies mainly under the 
same management continue to be unclear until the legislator or the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court explains it further. 
2.2 The first main rule and exceptions 
2.2.1 The first main rule 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are divided into main rules, 
supplementing rules and exceptions.37 According to the first main rule are 
interest expenses not deductible when they are related to debt between 
affiliated companies.38 All interest expenses related to debt between 
affiliated companies are covered by the rule. This is, thus, a deviation from 
the general rule that interest expenses are deductible for businesses.39 
                                                
29 Swedish Tax Agency, Skatteverkets ställningstaganden: Några frågor vid tillämpningen 
av ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna gällande väsentligt inflytande, undantaget från 10%-
regeln och ventilen, dnr 131-117306-13/11, 25 February 2013, ch. 4.2. 
30 Swedish Tax Agency, Response, Dialogfråga angående avdragsrätten för 
räntekostnader enligt 24§ 10a-f§ Inkomstskattelagen, 9 April 2013. 
31 See for example Jilkén, D. and Jilkén, C., Väsentligt inflytande och under huvudsak 
gemensam ledning – luddiga begrepp på drift?, Svensk Skattetidning, 2013, nr. 6/7, p. 498 
et seq. and 516; and Jilkén, C., Skatteverkets dialogsvar om ränteavdrag, Svensk 
Skattetidning, 2014, nr. 3, p. 193. 
32 Ch. 24, art. 10a para. 1 2p, SITA. 
33 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 46. 
34 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 48 f.. 
35 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 68, 72 and 87 et seq.: and prop. 2012/13:1 p. 217 with reference to 
prop. 1999/2000:2 p. 502 et seq.. 
36 Jilkén and Jilkén (n 33), 2013, p. 510. 
37 See ch. 24, art. 10b-f, SITA. 
38 Ch. 24, art. 10b, SITA. 
39 See ch. 16, art. 1, SITA. 
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2.2.2 The 10 %-rule 
The first exception is the so called 10 %-rule, according to which deduction 
of interest expenses is allowed if the beneficial owner of the interest income 
would have been taxed with at least 10 % in its State of residence, if the 
interest income was the only income of the beneficial owner.40 The 
beneficial owner is the company, which is the actual and rightful owner of 
the interest income and receives the income for its own use and enjoys the 
economical benefits from it.41 The purpose of the beneficial ownership 
concept in the 10 %-rule is to avoid situations where an intermediary 
company located in a jurisdiction with a corporate tax rate of at least 10 % is 
used to circumvent the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. 
The beneficial ownership concept was subject to a judgment by the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court where interest was paid from a Swedish 
company to a Dutch company. The Dutch company decided to make 
corresponding dividend payments to another Dutch company, which, 
subsequently, made corresponding interest payments to a US company. The 
US company was benefitting from the so-called “check-the-box” rules, 
which left the interest income untaxed. The Court concluded that the US 
company was the beneficial owner of the interest income, even though the 
Dutch company had to make a decision to pay dividends to the other Dutch 
company.42 The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court showed that the 
fact that a decision of dividend payments must be taken in the chain of 
transactions does not hinder a later company in the chain to be considered as 
the beneficial owner of the income. However, every situation where there is 
an onward-lending situation is not hindered by the rules. The situation 
where an intragroup bank borrows capital from an external bank and, 
subsequently, lends the capital to one of the companies within the group is 
not hindered by the beneficial ownership concept in the rule (but might be 
hindered by other conditions in the 10 %-rule).43 The Swedish Tax Agency 
has expressed its opinion on the matter but the beneficial ownership concept 
remains vague and is to be decided on case-by-case basis.44 
The 10 %-rule contains a hypothetical test to determine the level of taxation 
of the interest income. The interest income is to be treated as is it was the 
only income of the beneficial owner and consideration is, thus, not to be 
taken to loss or income derived from normal business operations or to other 
deductible expenses.45 The requirement of a certain level of taxation is 
fulfilled if the interest income, then, is deemed to be taxed with at least 10 
%. This applies regardless of the method of taxation.46 The consequence is 
that the 10 %-rule is not fulfilled if the interest income is neutralised by a 
                                                
40 Ch. 24, art. 10d para. 1, SITA. 
41 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 254 with reference to prop. 2008/09:65 p. 61. 
42 HFD 2012 not. 24. 
43 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 61 et seq.. 
44 See Swedish Tax Agency, Skatteverkets ställningstaganden: Avdragsrätt för räntor vid 
tillämpningen av ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna i 24 kap. 10 a – 10 f §§ IL i fall där 
ränot slussas genom ett eller flera svenska företag till ”det företag som faktiskt har rätt till 
inkomsten”och som inte beskattats eller beskattas under 10 % för inkomsten, dnr 131-
8239-13/111, 22 January 2013. 
45 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 59. 
46 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 60 and 63. 
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ground allowance or other similar deductions.47 For example, the Dutch 
Notional Interest Deduction (NID) was, in two judgments by the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court, considered as a deduction that needs to be 
taken into account when determining the applicable tax rate.48 
The abovementioned is applicable on permanent establishments as well. 
Deduction is not allowed if a permanent establishment is the beneficial 
owner of an interest income where the host State taxes the income with less 
than 10 % while the home State does not tax the income as a result of, for 
example, the exempt method.49 
2.2.3 The pension fund rule 
The pension fund rule applies to e.g. assurance companies 
(“livförsäkringsbolag in Swedish) and pension funds (“pensionsstiftelser” in 
Swedish).50 Deduction of interest expenses is allowed if the affiliated 
beneficial owner is liable to tax on yield of pension capital. Deduction is, 
regarding transactions involving foreign companies, allowed if the foreign 
company, although not liable to tax on yield on pension capital, is taxed in a 
similar way and at least equivalent to the Swedish tax on yield of pension 
capital.51 An additional requirement for deduction for both the Swedish and 
foreign companies is that the interest rate do not exceed 250 % of the 
average Swedish government borrowing rate (“statslåneränta” in Swedish) 
applied in the calendar year before the income year for tax purposes 
(“beskattningsår” in Swedish).52 
2.2.4 The exception to the 10 %-rule 
Deduction of interest expenses can be denied even though the conditions in 
the 10 %-rule and the pension fund rule are fulfilled. According to the 
exception to the 10 %-rule are interest expenses not deductible if the main 
reason for the debt arrangement is that the affiliated companies are to obtain 
a substantial tax advantage.53 The rule was introduced because it was shown 
that companies arranged their business virtually exclusively for tax purposes 
so they were taxed with a tax rate just above 10 %. The Swedish Tax 
Agency has the burden of proof for the application of the rule.54 
The rule is vague and hard to apply but some guidance can be found in the 
preworks to the rule. The determination of whether the main reason for the 
debt arrangement is to obtain tax advantages is to be made from the 
perspective of both the lender and the borrower. All relevant circumstances 
are to be considered.55 It is further stated that the term “mainly” is to be 
interpreted as 75 %, as mentioned above regarding affiliated companies 
                                                
47 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 60. 
48 HFD 2011 ref. 90 II and V. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ch. 24, art. 10d para. 2 1p, SITA with reference to art. 2 1-3p, Act (1990:661) on Tax on 
Yield on Pension Capital. See also Samuelsson, L., Regeringens slutliga förslag om 
effektivare ränteavdragsbegränsningar, Skattenytt, 2012, p. 822. 
51 Ch. 24, art. 10d para. 2 1p, SITA. 
52 Ch. 24, art. 10d para. 2 2p, SITA. 
53 Ch. 24, art. 10d para. 3, SITA. 
54 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 247 et seq.. 
55 Ibid. 
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under mainly the same management (2.2.1).56 It is, regarding the term 
“substantial tax advantage”, stated that the purpose is not to cover small 
amounts but that consideration should be taken to whether the arrangement 
results in tax advantages in more than one income year for tax purposes.57 
Some, but in no way exhaustive, examples to consider in the determination 
are mentioned in the preworks. Structures that are not allowed deduction of 
interest expenses are, for example, structures where a company with 
comprehensive shortfalls and no liquid assets acts, for tax purposes, as a 
lender to an affiliated company where the lended liquid assets have been 
borrowed from another affiliated company. The purpose can be to take 
advantage of a shortfall in a specific jurisdiction or to avoid the Swedish 
group contribution rules. The origin of the capital has significance in the 
way that self-generated capital may, from a perspective of the lender, 
indicate that the transaction is not mainly made for tax purposes. Also, the 
level of taxation of the borrower is a factor to take into consideration. 
Another situation where deduction is not allowed is where an affiliation in 
connection with an acquisition of shares creates new companies with the 
main purpose of having a debt claim.58 
The Swedish Council on Advance Tax Rulings has given two advanced 
rulings (“förhandsbesked” in Swedish) regarding the exception to the 10 %-
rule. The beneficial owner of the interest income was, in the first case, taxed 
with a tax rate of 22 % when the Belgian NID was not used at all and with a 
tax rate of 13,3 % if it was used to its maximum. The Swedish Council of 
Advance Tax Rulings stated that the interest expenses were deductible when 
the interest income was taxed with 22 % but not when it was taxed with 
13,3 %. The affiliated companies were considered to obtain a substantial tax 
advantage in the later case.59 The other case concerned a structure where the 
interest income was neutralised by losses at the beneficial owner. The 
Swedish Council of Advance Rulings considered that the structure resulted 
in a substantial tax advantage for the affiliated companies and denied 
deduction for the interest expenses.60 Both advanced rulings were appealed 
to the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court, which decided not to rule on 
the matter. The Court stated that the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules require extensive investigation and evidence from different parties and 
are, thus, not suitable for advanced rulings.61 
Academic writers and the Swedish Tax Agency have tried to interpret the 
exception to the 10 %-rule but it has been concluded that any certainty 
cannot be given to the interpretations since the rule is vague and the 
preworks do not give detailed guidance.62 It is, however, stated in the 
                                                
56 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 251 with reference to prop. 1999/2000:2 del 1 p. 505. 
57 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 252. 
58 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 253 et seq.. 
59 Advanced ruling, 2014-04-29, dnr 80/13/D. 
60 Advanced ruling, 2014-07-10, dnr 92-13/D. 
61 HFD mål nr. 2674-14; and HFD mål nr. 4217-14. 
62 Carneborn, C., Nya tioprocentsregeln – En ren beräkningsregel?, Skattenytt, 2013, p. 46-
51; and Swedish Tax Agency, Skatteverkets ställningstaganden – Några frågor vid 
tillämpningen av ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna gällande väsentligt inflytande, 
undantaget från 10 %-regeln och ventilen, dnr 131-117306-13/11, 25 February 2013, ch. 
4.3-4. 
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preworks that guidance for the application of the rule can be taken from the 
so-called business purpose rule, which will be explained below. 
2.2.5 The business purpose rule 
Another exception to the first main rule is the so-called business purpose 
rule (“ventilen” in Swedish) and allows deduction for interest expenses if 
the transaction is mainly business motivated (“huvudsakligen affärsmässigt 
motiverad” in Swedish), regardless of the 10 %-rule.63 The business purpose 
rule intends to cover structures, which are taxed with a low tax rate but 
where the transactions are mainly business motivated and, thus, do not 
constitute such structures that the rules are meant to hinder.64 The rule is 
only applicable if the affiliated beneficial owner of the interest income is 
resident in a State within the EU or in a State with whom Sweden has a 
relevant double tax treaty.65 
The exception from the 10 %-rule and the business purpose rule have 
different areas of application. Deduction of interest expenses is denied under 
the exception to the 10 %-rule if the interest income is taxed with at least a 
10 % tax rate in the State of the beneficial owner and if at least 75 % of the 
reasons for the transaction are tax reasons (deduction is, thus, allowed if the 
transaction is more than 25 % business motivated). Deduction is allowed 
under the business purpose rule if the interest income is taxed with a tax rate 
lower than 10 % in the State of the beneficial owner and if at least 75 % of 
the transaction is business motivated (deduction is, thus, denied if the 
transaction is more than 25 % tax motivated). 
The Swedish Government has stated that it is not possible to describe in 
detail all the situations, which entails deduction of the interest expenses as a 
result of the business purpose rule, but that an overall assessment is to be 
made with all relevant circumstances related to the debt arrangement. All 
specific circumstances in the specific case are of relevance.66 Even though a 
tax, nevertheless, is a cost for a company and that companies, therefore, 
might argue that decisions taken on the basis of tax purposes are business 
motivated, this is not part of the determination whether a transaction is 
mainly business motivated. The determination is to be made without 
consideration to tax effects. The business purpose rule is already applicable 
when a transaction is partially motivated by tax reasons (25 % or less).67 
Some indications that a transaction is mainly business motivated are that the 
beneficial owner of the interest income conducts a real economic activity in 
its State of residence and that the interest expenses are not remarkably large 
in comparison to interest expenses in connection with debt to a company 
located in a high-tax jurisdiction. Short-term debt (for example cash-pool 
business) is, as stated by the Swedish Government, considered as being 
mainly business motivated in most cases. A transaction is, to the contrary, 
most likely not mainly business motivated if the interest income is not taxed 
                                                
63 Ch. 24, art. 10e para. 1, SITA. 
64 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 255 with reference to prop. 2008/09:65 p. 67 and 87. 
65 Ch. 24, art. 10e para. 1, SITA. 
66 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 256 et seq.. 
67 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 257. See also HFD 2011 ref. 90 I-V. 
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in the State of residence of the beneficial owner or if the interest income can 
be neutralised by further distribution with a right to deduction. Another 
example is if hybrid financial instruments or hybrid entities are used in 
order to obtain tax advantages.68 Unlike the exception to the 10 %-rule, it is 
the taxpayer who wants to deduct the interest expenses that has the burden 
of proof and, thus, has to show that the transaction is mainly business 
motivated.69 
When determining whether a debt arrangement is business motivated shall 
particular regard be taken to if finance, instead, could have been made in the 
form of equity from the lender, another affiliated company or a company 
higher in the organisation.70 Regard shall be taken to if another finance 
legally could have been given, the degree of influence the financing 
company has in the borrowing company (for example through shares) and to 
what extent commercial considerations would be affected negatively by an 
alternative finance through equity (“kapitaltillskott” in Swedish) and what 
the consequences would be.71 
The origin of the capital is a factor to consider in the determination. A 
transaction is, most likely, not mainly business motivated if the lender has 
received finance in order to be able to give a loan to the borrower or if the 
lender, subsequently, transfers the debt claim to another company in the 
affiliation. The company financing the lender could, in this situation, just as 
well have financed the borrower directly. The same applies to the company 
receiving the debt claim.72 
The fact that the possibility to finance through equity instead of debt and 
that the origin of the capital are factors to consider when determining 
whether a transaction is mainly business motivated was first explained by 
the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court in several judgments given in 
late 2011.73 This was partially implemented in the rules and explained in the 
preworks to the rules when they were revised in 2013.74 The Court 
concluded that a difference between business reasons and organisational 
reasons should be made when determining whether a transaction is mainly 
business motivated.75 The Court, further, stated that the business purpose 
rule is applicable and a transaction is, thus, mainly business motivated if an 
external acquisition of shares was followed by an internal acquisition of the 
shares and the internal transaction, with regard to time and other 
circumstances, is considered a mere step of inserting the company into the 
affiliation.76 The legal value of the judgments in 2011 is a debated subject. It 
is on one hand argued that the difference between business- and 
organisational reasons is not applicable on the basis that it is contradictory 
                                                
68 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 257. 
69 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 256. 
70 Ch. 24, art. 10e para. 3, SITA; and prop. 2012/13:1 p. 262 et seq.. 
71 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 263. 
72 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 257 and 261. 
73 HFD 2011 ref. 90 I-V. 
74 One difference is that the judgments concern wholly owned companies while the present 
rules apply to affiliated companies. 
75 See especially HFD 2011 ref. 90 II. 
76 See especially HFD 2011 ref. 90 I. The statement was confirmed in cases HFD 2012 not. 
3; and HFD 2012 not. 23. 
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to the preworks and the fact that the Swedish Government has explicitly 
denied that there is a difference.77 It is on the other hand argued that the 
judgments still have value but are to have an extended application to comply 
with the present rules. External acquisitions of shares are, thus, also covered 
by the rules.78 
2.3 The second main rule and exceptions 
The first main rule applies to affiliated companies but interest expenses can 
be denied deduction if the expenses are related to a debt to a non-affiliated 
company as well. According to the second main rule are interest expenses 
not deductible if a company has a debt to another company, which is not 
affiliated to it, if an affiliated company to the first-mentioned company has a 
debt claim on the second-mentioned company or a company, which is 
affiliated to it (so-called back-to-back loans). This, however, only applies if 
the debt has a connection to the debt claim and the debt concerns an 
acquisition of shares from a company, which is affiliated to it, or from a 
company, which will be affiliated to it after the acquisition.79 
The purpose of the denial of deduction is to avoid situations where an 
external company is used as an intermediary in a transaction of an 
acquisition of a company.80 In order to determine whether deduction of the 
interest expenses is allowed shall regard be taken to all circumstances in the 
specific case.81 The term “shares” has a vide definition and includes 
convertibles, subscription rights, parts in co-operative economic 
associations, net current assets and similar parts of ownership or rights.82 
The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court has determined that 
acquisitions by new share issues (“nyemission” in Swedish) are covered by 
the rule.83 
There are two alternative exceptions to the second main rule. According to 
the first exception are interest expenses deductible if the 10 %-rule, the 
pension fund rule or the exception to the 10 %-rule are applicable on the 
case. The rules are to be interpreted in the same way as explained above.84 
According to the second exception are interest expenses deductible if the 
transaction is mainly business motivated. The same definition is to be 
applied with the same limitations of companies covered by the rule.85 
                                                
77 Kal, M.K., En säkerhetsventil utan säkerhet – en analys av rekvisitet ”affärsmässigt 
motiverat” i 24 kap. 10 E § IL, Juridisk Publikation, 2013, p. 241. 
78 Samuelsson (n 52), 2012, p. 829. 
79 Ch. 24, art. 10c, SITA. 
80 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 54 et seq.; and prop. 2012/13:1 p. 266. 
81 prop. 2008/09:65 p. 50. 
82 Ch. 48, art. 2, SITA; and prop. 2008/09:65 p. 49 et seq.. 
83 HFD 2011 ref. 90 V. 
84 Ch. 24, art. 10f 1p, SITA. 
85 Ch. 24, art. 10f 2p, SITA. 
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3 Compatibility with the fundamental freedoms of 
EU law 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section it is analysed whether the Swedish interest deduction rules 
are compatible with the fundamental freedoms of EU law. The opinions of 
the European Commission, the Swedish Government and national Courts 
will be presented but the analysis in the thesis is separate from the opinions 
of the parties. The applicable freedom or freedoms on the Swedish rules are 
initially determined. Which fundamental freedom that is applicable is an 
important aspect since they have e.g. temporal and territorial differences that 
might have an impact on the analysis.86 An analysis is, subsequently, 
conducted of whether the interest deduction limitation rules are 
discriminatory or restrictive. If it is found that the rules are discriminatory or 
restrictive, it is analysed whether the rules are justified by an overriding 
reason in the public interest. Lastly, if the rules are justified, it is examined 
whether the rules are proportionate.87 
3.2 Applicable freedom(s) 
Within the EU there are several fundamental freedoms, namely the free 
movement of persons88, free movement of goods89, free movement of 
workers90, freedom of establishment91, freedom to provide services92 and the 
free movement of capital93, all of which are part of the aim to establish an 
internal market.94 It can be concluded that the free movement of persons, the 
free movement of goods and the movement of workers are not relevant for 
the analysis since the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules only apply 
for companies and does not concern goods. It is, therefore, to be determined 
whether the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services or 
the free movement of capital is applicable on the Swedish rules. 
The European Commission has, in its letter of formal notice to the Swedish 
Government, stated that the freedom of establishment is applicable on the 
Swedish rules and has conducted a compatibility analysis on the basis of 
that particular fundamental freedom alone.95 The Swedish Government is 
also of the opinion that the freedom of establishment is applicable on the 
                                                
86 Smit, D.D., The relationship between the free movement of capital and the other EC 
Treaty freedoms in third country relationships in the field of direct taxation: a question of 
exclusivity, parallelism or causality?, EC Tax Review, 2007/6, p. 257. 
87 C-55/94 Gebhard, para. 37. See also Wattel, P.J., Forum: Interaction of State Aid, Free 
movement, Policy Competition and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters, World Tax 
Journal, Vol. 5 nr. 1, 2013, p. 129 et seq.. 
88 Art. 21 TFEU. 
89 Art. 34-36 TFEU. 
90 Art. 45 TFEU. 
91 Art 49-54 TFEU. 
92 Art. 56-62 TFEU. 
93 Art. 63 TFEU. 
94 Art. 2 (3) TEU. See also M. Helminen, EU Tax Law – Direct Taxation – 2013, IBFD, 
2013, chapter 2.2.1. 
95 SG-Greffe (2014) D/17633, case no. 2013/4206, 24 November 2014. 
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rules. This has been stated in the preworks to the rules and in the answer to 
the letter of formal notice from the European Commission.96 The EU law 
compatibility of the Swedish rules has been ruled upon by the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court and the Court conducted the compatibility 
analysis on the basis of the freedom of establishment and, thus, shares the 
opinion with the European Commission and the Swedish Government.97  
It is, however, in the author’s opinion, not a certainty that the compatibility 
analysis is to be made on the basis of the freedom of establishment, as other 
freedoms also might be relevant. The freedom of establishment gives EU 
nationals the right to establish in another Member State as a self-employed 
person or through an undertaking. It also gives the right to establish and 
pursue activities in another Member State through agencies, branches and 
subsidiaries.98 The registered office for companies serves as nationality for 
individuals, making the freedom in question useful for companies as well.99 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules falls within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment since the freedom applies to investments and 
holdings of equity and debt in a company in another Member State.100 
The freedom to provide services gives EU nationals who are established or 
resides within the EU the right to provide services in another Member State 
and to be treated the same way as the nationals of that State.101 Even though 
the freedom only refers to the right to provide services it includes a 
corresponding right to receive services as well.102 The Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules are covered by the freedom to provide services 
since the rules apply to interest related to debt between affiliated companies. 
The issue of a loan is covered by the term “services” in the freedom.103 
The free movement of capital applies to capital movements and payments 
and covers the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules since the 
freedom, as with the freedom of establishment, applies to investments and 
holdings of equity and debt investments in a company in another Member 
State.104 
Since the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the 
free movement of capital can be applied on the Swedish rules it is necessary 
to determine the relationship between the freedoms and, thus, how the 
                                                
96 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 269; and the answers by the Swedish Government to the European 
Commission, dnr. Fi2013/153; and dnr. Fi2014/4205. 
97 HFD 2011 ref. 90 II-V. 
98 Art. 49-54 TFEU. 
99 See for example 270/83 Commission v France (Avoir Fiscal), para. 18; C.446/03 Marks 
& Spencer, para. 30; and C-231/05 Oy AA, para. 29. 
100 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, paragraphs (paras.) 27-32; C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes 
and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, para. 32; C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation, para. 118; C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, para. 33; 
and joined cases C-39/13, C-40/13 and C-41/13 SCA Group Holdings and Others, para. 23. 
101 Art. 56-62 TFEU. 
102 C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson, para. 12; and C-294/97 Eurowings, para. 34. 
103 Art. 57 TFEU; C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson, para. 11; C-222/95 Parodi, para.17; 
and C-452/04 Fidium Finanz, para. 40. 
104 C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson, para. 7; C-242/03 Weidert-Paulus, para. 15; C-
265/04 Bouanich, para. 29; C-452/04 Fidium Finanz, paras. 42-43; C-190/12 Emerging 
Markets Series, para. 25; and C-282/12 Itelcar, para. 14. 
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compatibility analysis is to be conducted. The ECJ did not, in early cases, 
apply a priority between the different freedoms and, therefore, interpreted 
the compatibility of the national rules with the fundamental freedoms, which 
were included in the referred questions by the national courts.105 The ECJ 
did not, in subsequent cases, address all fundamental freedoms included in 
the referred questions but neither did the Court explain its preference for one 
freedom over the other.106 The ECJ stated, in 2002, that where a national 
measure restricts both the free movement of goods and the freedom to 
provide services, the predominant freedoms gets priority over the other, 
creating what academic writers refers to as the dominance rule.107 This rule 
was later used in relation to the freedom of establishment, the freedom to 
provide services and the free movement of capital where the ECJ concluded 
that an independent examination of the freedoms was not motivated if a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services and the free movement of 
capital were an unavoidable consequence of a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment.108 The ECJ, thus, concluded that the freedom of 
establishment had priority over other freedoms if the freedom of 
establishment was the predominant freedom in the case.109 
Establishing the dominance rule, questions still remain on how to determine 
which fundamental freedom is predominant. The ECJ has, regarding the 
relationship between the freedom to provide services and the free movement 
of capital, stated that the purpose of the national rule is to govern which 
fundamental freedom that is applicable on the rule.110 The ECJ has, on the 
other hand, regarding the relationship between the freedom of establishment 
and the free movement of capital, created the so-called definite-influence 
rule. This means that the freedom of establishment applies where a 
shareholding confer definite influence over a company´s decisions and 
allows the shareholder to determine its activities while the free movement of 
capital applies where a shareholder does not have such influence.111 
The ECJ has been inconsistent in its case law regarding how to determine 
whether definite influence is established. On one hand are the facts of the 
case to be used to determine whether definite influence exists, also referred 
to as the facts-of-the-case rule. This means that the facts in a specific case 
are to be regarded and if a shareholding gives definite influence in another 
company is the freedom of establishment to be applied on the rule, 
regardless of the characteristics of the applicable national legislation.112 The 
consequence of the facts-of-the-case rule is that one freedom will always 
                                                
105 See C-204/90 Bachmann. 
106 C-302/97 Konle, para. 22; and C-200/98 X AB and Y AB, paras. 4, 24, 28 and 30. 
107 C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital, para. 31. 
108 C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, para. 33. 
109 See also C-452/04 Fidium Finanz, para. 49 where the ECJ stated that the freedom to 
provide services was the predominant freedom in the specific case. 
110 C-452/04 Fidium Finanz, paragraphs 45 and 49. 
111 C-251/98 C. Baars, para. 22; C-208/00 Uberseering BV, para. 77; C-436/00 X and Y, 
para. 37 and 66-68; C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, para. 
31; and C-492/04 Lasertec, paras. 20-24. 
112 C-436/00 X and Y, paras. 37, 65 and 68; C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas, para. 31; C-284/06 Burda, paras. 69 and 70; and C-303/07 Aberdeen 
Property Fininvest Alpha Oy, paras. 31-36. 
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have priority in relation to the other freedoms. On the other hand, however, 
is the purpose of the national rule to determine whether definite influence is 
established, also known as the applicable-legislation rule. This means that if 
a national rule is considered specific, meaning that the rule applies only in 
cases where a company either has definite influence in another company or 
does not have such influence, is the freedom of establishment to be applied 
where definite influence is required and the free movement of capital when 
definite influence is not required. If a national rule, however, is considered 
generic, meaning that the rule applies regardless of if definite influence 
exists in another company, are both the freedom of establishment and the 
free movement of capital to be applied and examined in the case.113 It is not 
clear when an investment gives a decisive influence but a shareholding of 
25 % has been accepted by the ECJ.114 
The inconsistency of the ECJ on the matter is also shown in the fact that the 
ECJ, after the introduction of the dominance rule, the definite-influence 
rule, the facts-of-the-case rule and the applicable-legislation rule, has, in 
some cases, abandoned the dominance rule and made implications that other 
factors than definite influence can be taken in consideration when 
determining the predominant freedom, such as whether the rule aims to 
hinder companies from obtaining an undue tax advantage.115 It can, 
however, be concluded that there is always a dominant freedom (except for 
generic rules when applying the applicable-legislation rule) but that the ECJ 
has not been consistent in how to determine this dominant freedom in a 
specific case.116 
When determining the applicable freedom on the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules it can be concluded that the freedom of establishment and 
the free movement of capital have more relevance than the freedom to 
provide services. The purpose of the Swedish rules is to hinder the 
movement of profits to low-tax jurisdictions using interest related to debt 
between affiliated companies. The focus is not on the service per se but, 
instead, on the fact that companies are taking advantage of ownership in 
other companies and as a result can shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. 
Regarding the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital it 
is not clear whether the purpose of the Swedish rules is that they are to 
apply where definite influence exists. The rules can be applicable on the 
basis on ownership but any detailed amount of ownership has not been 
given, as explained above (2.1). It can from the wording and the preworks to 
the rules be concluded that the Swedish rules are applicable on an ownership 
                                                
113 C-492/04 Lasertec, paras. 19-23; C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group 
Litigation, paras. 26-33; C-157/05 Winfried L. Holböck, paras. 22-24; C-318/07 Hein 
Persche, para. 28; C-35/11 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, paras. 90-92 and 99; 
C-168/11 Beker, para. 30; and C-282/12 Itelcar, paras. 22-25. 
114 C-31/11 Scheunemann, paras. 25 and 29. 
115 See C-298/05 Columbus Container Services, paras. 32 and 55-56; and C-105/07 NV 
Lammers & Van Cleeff NV, paras. 16,17 and 35 for the abandonment of the dominance 
rule and C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, para. 50 for the alternative rule to the definite-
influence rule. 
116 Hemels, S. et. al., Freedom of Establishment or Free Movement of Capital: Is There an 
Order of Priority? Conflicting Visions of National Courts and the ECJ, EC Tax Review, 
2010-1, p. 28. 
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of at least 40-50 %. Even though the Swedish rules do not require 
ownership for the rules to be applicable, it can be argued that definite 
influence cannot only be achieved through ownership but also if the 
companies are mainly under the same management. This can, following the 
applicable-legislation rule, imply that the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules are specific and apply where there is a definite influence in 
another company and that the freedom of establishment is applicable on the 
rules. The facts-of-the-case rule cannot apply in the present compatibility 
analysis since the analysis is not based on a specific case. The national rules 
are the only factor to be regarded, which is also the case in the European 
Commission´s investigation of the Swedish rules and in judgments where 
the European Commission has brought an infringement procedure before the 
ECJ.117 
A different result is given if the opinion of the Swedish Tax Authority is 
followed since it has held that a 10 % ownership is enough for the Swedish 
interest deduction limitation rules to be applicable.118 The rules would on 
that basis be considered generic and, following the applicable-legislation 
rule, both the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital 
would be examined in the analysis. It is, however, to be considered that the 
Swedish interest deduction limitation rules apply to shareholdings giving 
definite influence and the compatibility analysis is, thus, to be made on the 
basis of the freedom of establishment. The reasoning in the response by the 
Swedish Tax Agency has low legal value and is not convincing as it is 
partially based on rules and judgments regarding the taxation of individuals. 
The Swedish Tax Agency refers to cases regarding whether an individual 
has an unlimited tax liability in Sweden through substantial ownership in a 
business.119 It is in the preworks to the rules stated that the term substantial 
influence is to be interpreted as throughout the Swedish tax system when 
determining whether companies (italics added) are affiliated and the 
Swedish rules concerning trade investments (“näringsbetingade andelar” in 
Swedish) are explicitly mentioned.120 The definition by the Swedish Tax 
Agency is not in line with the preworks and The Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court would, most likely, not accept such a definition for the 
application of the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. Further, as the 
Swedish Supreme Administrative Court has used the freedom of 
establishment when determining whether the Swedish rules are compatible 
with EU law, that might imply that the Court, implicitly, has stated that the 
rules apply where there is definite influence. The abovementioned shows 
that even though the freedom of establishment is the applicable freedom for 
the purposes of the thesis, it is not acte éclairé or acte clair and the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court should have referred the issue to the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling. 
 
                                                
117 See for example C-531/06 Commission v Italy, para. 40; C-207/07 Commission v Spain, 
paras. 35-36; and C-326/07 Commission v Italy, para. 36. 
118 Swedish Tax Agency, Response, Dialogfråga angående avdragsrätten för 
räntekostnader enligt 24§ 10a-f§ Inkomstskattelagen, 9 April 2013. 
119 See ch. 3, art. 3 and 7, SITA; and cases RÅ 2001 not. 1; RÅ 2004 not. 215; and RÅ 
2006 ref. 67. 
120 Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 239. 
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3.3 Discrimination and restriction 
For a national rule to be incompatible with the freedom of establishment it 
must be either discriminatory or restrictive. The discriminatory test can be 
divided into direct discrimination and indirect discrimination and precludes 
national legislation which treat two nationals of different Member States in 
comparable situations differently or legislation which treat two nationals of 
different Member States in different situations alike.121 A national 
legislation is considered directly discriminatory if the rule discriminates on 
the basis of nationality while it is indirectly discriminatory if, even though 
the legislation in its application is neutral regarding nationality, cross-border 
situations particularly come under the scope of application of the legislation 
and thus, indirectly discriminates on the basis of nationality.122 Even though 
a national rule is not discriminatory it can be precluded by the freedom of 
establishment if it is considered restrictive or as a non-discriminatory 
restriction, as it is also called. A national rule is restrictive for the purposes 
of the freedom of establishment if it prohibits, impede or render less 
attractive the exercise of the named freedom.123 
The European Commission has, in its letter of formal notice to the Swedish 
Government, stated that the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are 
indirectly discriminatory. It is the 10 %-rule that is the focus of the analysis. 
The European Commission reasons that the 10 %-rule does not differentiate 
between residents and non-residents but is indirectly discriminatory since it 
is unlikely that domestic loans between affiliated companies will ever be 
considered as being made in order to obtain a substantial tax advantage as 
the Swedish corporate tax rate is 22 %. The Swedish rules, thus, affects in 
practice only cross-border loans between affiliated companies and forms a 
hinder to the freedom of establishment.124 
The Swedish Government and the Swedish Courts have, however, in the 
preworks to the rules, the answer to the letter of formal notice from the 
European Commission and several judgments, stated that the rules are 
compatible with the freedom of establishment.125 The Government and the 
Swedish Courts reason that the rules are not directly discriminatory since 
they are neutral regarding nationality. The rules, or more specifically the 10 
%-rule, are, further, not indirectly discriminatory or restrictive on the basis 
that the ECJ has stated that it is not discriminatory to require a certain level 
                                                
121 See for example C-279/93 Schumacker, para. 30; C-80/94 Wielockx, para. 17; C-107/94 
Asscher, paras. 32 and 42; C-250/95 Futura, para. 24; and C-311/97 Royal Bank of 
Scotland, para. 27. 
122 See C-330/91 Commerzbank, para. 14; C-294/97 Eurowings, paras. 35-40; C-324/00 
Lankhorst-Hohorst, paras. 27-32; C-383/05 Talotta, para. 32; and C-385/12 Hervis Sport, 
para. 41. See also Wouters, J., The Principle of Non-discrimination in European 
Community Law, EC Tax Review, 1999, p. 103 et seq.; Farmer, P., EC law and Direct 
Taxation – Some Thoughts on Recent Issues, EC Tax Journal, 1995/96, p. 93; and 
Dahlberg, M., Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of Establishment and the Free 
Movement of Capital, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, The Hague, 2005, p. 95. 
123 C-415/93 Bosman, para. 96; C-55/94 Gebhard, para. 37; C-157/07 Krankenheim, para. 
30; and C-326/12 van Caster, paras. 34-37. 
124 SG-Greffe (2014) D/17633, case no. 2013/4206, 24 November 2014. 
125 HFD 2011 ref. 90 II-V; Advanced rulings 2014-04-16, dnr. 71-13/D and 2014-04-29, 
dnr. 80-13/D; prop. 2012/13:1 s. 268-270; and dnr. Fi2014/4205. 
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of taxation in the State of the beneficial owner and that differences in tax 
treatment as a result of differences between the legislation of the Member 
States are not discriminatory if the rules apply objectively and without 
consideration to nationality. The requirement of a specific level of taxation 
of the interest income in the 10 %-rule is, thus, not indirectly discriminatory 
or restrictive.126 
There are, clearly, different views on whether the 10 %-rule is 
discriminatory or restrictive. A national rule is directly discriminatory if, as 
mentioned above, it treats two nationals of different Member States in 
comparable situations differently or if it treats two nationals of different 
Member States in different situations alike. The discrimination test can be 
made with a vertical or horizontal approach. The vertical approach means 
that a cross-border situation and a domestic situation are examined.127 The 
comparator to a Swedish wholly internal situation where a Swedish 
company is giving a loan to an affiliated Swedish company is, using the 
vertical approach, a cross-border situation where a company resident in a 
Member State with a corporate tax rate below 10 % (according to the 
hypothetical test in the rule) gives an identical loan to an affiliated Swedish 
company. 
Whether the situations are comparable can be decided on the basis of a per-
country approach or an overall approach, whereas the per-country approach 
means that the legal situation in Sweden is considered while the overall 
approach means that the legal situation in the other Member State also is 
considered.128 The ECJ has applied the methods inconsistently in its case 
law in order to determine whether the situations are comparable or not.129 It 
is evident that, regardless of whether the per-country approach or overall 
approach is used, the Swedish wholly internal situation and the cross-border 
situation are comparable since an identical loan is given in both situations. 
The only difference is that the residence of the lender in the cross-border 
situation is in another Member State than Sweden. 
Different results are given in the situations as the interest expenses are 
deductible in the Swedish wholly internal situation but not in the cross-
border situation (assuming that the business purpose rule is not applicable). 
The difference in results, however, do not depend on differences in 
treatment on the basis of nationality but, instead, on the level of taxation of 
the interest income in the State of the beneficial owner. The 10 %-rule is, 
using the vertical approach, thus, not directly discriminatory. 
                                                
126 The Swedish Government and the Swedish Courts refer especially to C-403/03 
Schempp, para. 34; C-231/05 Oy AA, para. 37; and C-371/10 National Grid Indus, para. 62. 
127 Carrero, J.M.C. et. al., The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and Its 
Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to Shed Light on the Scope of the Non-discrimination 
Principle, Intertax, Vol. 37 issue 4, 2009, p. 213 et seq.. 
128 Lang, M., ECJ case law on cross-border dividend taxation – recent developments, EC 
Tax Review, 2008/2, p. 72; and Bizioli, G., Balancing the Fundamental Freedoms and Tax 
Sovereignty: Some Thoughts on Recent ECJ Case Law on Direct Taxation, IBFD, European 
Taxation, Mar 2008, p. 135 et seq.. 
129 For the per-country approach see C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, paras. 27 and 29; and C-
347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz, para. 34; and for the overall approach see C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer, paras. 36-40; and C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, 
paras. 39, 40, 59 and 60. 
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The horizontal approach means that two cross-border situations are 
examined. The comparator to a cross-border situation where a company 
resident in a Member State with a corporate tax rate of at least 10 % 
(according to the hypothetical test) gives a loan to an affiliated Swedish 
company is another cross-border situation where a company resident in a 
Member State with a corporate tax rate below 10 % (according to the 
hypothetical test) gives an identical loan to an affiliated Swedish company. 
The situations are comparable, regardless of whether the per-country 
approach or overall approach is used, since, as when using the vertical 
approach, the companies are giving an identical loan to an affiliated 
Swedish company. The only difference is the level of taxation in the State of 
the lender. Different results are given when applying the 10 %-rule but the 
differences are not based on nationality. The differences are, instead, based 
on the level of taxation in the State of the beneficial owner of the interest 
income (the lender). The 10 %-rule is, as agreed between the European 
Commission, the Swedish Government, the Swedish Courts and several 
academic authors and regardless of whether the vertical or horizontal 
approach is used, not directly discriminatory. 
Even though the 10 %-rule is not directly discriminatory it can be 
considered indirectly discriminatory if cross-border situations particularly 
come under the scope of the application of the rule and the difference in 
treatment, thus, indirectly, is based on nationality. Some examples of 
conditions for national legislation to be indirectly discriminatory are if 
foreign nationals are treated differently from nationals, foreign nationals are 
more likely to receive such treatment and if the foreign national is in the 
same or substantially the same tax position as a national.130 The fact that the 
10 %-rule is applicable depending on the level of tax in the State of the 
beneficial owner of the interest income and that the foreign national 
taxpayer and the Swedish taxpayer are in, at least, a substantially the same 
tax position have been shown above. The question is, thus, whether the 10 
%-rule is more likely to apply to foreign nationals than for Swedish 
nationals. 
It is clearly stated in the preworks to the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules that the aim is to prevent evasion of the Swedish tax base.131 
This shows that the rules aim to hinder excessive interest payments to 
foreign companies as interest payments to Swedish companies does not 
affect the Swedish tax base (the beneficial owner will be taxed in Sweden 
for the interest income). It is, further, rare that the 10 %-rule is applicable in 
a Swedish wholly internal situation since the corporate tax rate is 22 %. The 
10 %-rule might be applicable in Swedish wholly internal situations when 
municipalities and investment companies are involved since municipalities 
are not subject to tax in Sweden and investment companies have right to 
deductions, which might lower the effective tax rate to below 10 %.132 The 
similar question was ruled upon in a judgment by the Supreme Court of the 
                                                
130 Farmer (n 124), 1995/96, p. 93 via Dahlberg (n 124), 2005, p. 95. 
131 Prop. 2012/13:1 s. 229. 
132 Regarding municipalities see ch. 7, art. 2 2p, SITA and regarding investment companies 
see ch. 39, art. 14-24a, SITA. 
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Netherlands (Hoge Raad) where the Court concluded that the Dutch interest 
deduction limitation rules are indirectly discriminatory on the basis of the 
freedom of establishment.133 The judgment is of relevance since the 
Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are based on the Dutch rules.134 
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands stated that the 10 %-rule was 
indirectly discriminatory since it, even though neutral in relation to 
nationality, was more likely to apply to cross-border situations than to 
wholly internal situations.135 The ECJ has, in addition, regarding the 
German thin capitalization rules, which were also neutral in relation to 
nationality, stated that the rules were more likely to apply to cross-border 
situations than to German domestic situations and concluded that the rules 
were indirectly discriminatory.136 The Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules are on the basis of the abovementioned to be considered as indirectly 
discriminatory. 
The 10 %-rule is also to be considered as restrictive since the rule renders 
less attractive transactions where a Swedish company takes a loan from a 
foreign affiliated company or where a foreign company gives a loan to a 
Swedish affiliated company (there are two perspectives to the same 
situation). There is, thus, an increased insecurity with foreign loans than 
with domestic loans and vice versa (dependent on the perspective).137 The 
Swedish Government and the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court have, 
as mentioned above, stated that the 10 %-rule is not discriminatory or 
restrictive since the ECJ has concluded that EU law does not preclude a 
requirement of a certain level of taxation in the hands of the receiver. The 
ECJ has, however, in a more recent judgment, stated that the requirement of 
a certain level of taxation of the receiver is to be considered as a 
restriction.138 The argument by the Swedish Government and the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court, thus, cannot be upheld and the 10 %-rule is 
to be considered a restriction on the freedom of establishment.139 
As it has been concluded that the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules 
are indirectly discriminatory and constitutes a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment, the analysis proceeds with an investigation of whether the 
Swedish rules can be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest. 
                                                
133 See case Hoge Raad 1 maart 2013, 11/00675, LJN BV1426, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BV1426. The judgment can be downloaded in its original language at 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BV1426. 
134 Prop. 2008/09:65 p. 59; and prop. 2012/13:1 p. 236. 
135 See Ohlsson, F., Dags för HFD att begära ett förhandsavgörande om 
ränteavdragsbegränsningarna?, Skattenytt, 2014, p. 652 et seq. regarding the impact of the 
judgment by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules. 
136 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, paras. 28 and 32. 
137 Ohlsson (n 137), 2014, p. 655; and Dahlberg (n 20), 2011, p. 419. 
138 C-318/10 SIAT, paras. 25-29. 
139 Dahlberg (n 20), 2011, p. 419-433; and Andersson, T. and Carneborn, C., HFD:s domar 
den 30 november 2011 avseende ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna – en kommentar, 
Svensk Skattetidning, 2012, p. 68-72. 
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3.4 Justifications by overriding reasons in the public interest 
3.4.1 Introduction 
A discriminatory and restrictive measure can, in accordance with the rule of 
reason doctrine, be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest.140 
The ECJ has in its case law accepted various justification grounds, namely 
the safeguarding of the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the need to 
ensure recovery of a tax debt, the safeguarding of the fiscal cohesion of the 
national tax system, the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing 
rights between Member States, the need to prevent double use of losses, the 
prevention of tax avoidance and, lastly, the territoriality principle.141 The 
analysis in the thesis, thus, proceeds with an investigation whether the 
abovementioned justification grounds can justify the indirectly 
discriminatory and restrictive Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. 
3.4.2 The safeguarding of effectiveness of fiscal supervision and the 
need to ensure recovery of a tax debt 
The need for an effective tax control and, thus, rules with the purpose of the 
effective collection of taxes in cross-border situations, can justify 
discriminatory and restrictive measures.142 This particular justification 
ground applies to administrative measures such as a requirement that the 
amount of expenditure a taxpayer intends to deduct as a business expense 
can be ascertained clearly and precisely.143 The ECJ has been reluctant with 
the justification of discriminatory and restrictive measures with the 
safeguarding of effectiveness of fiscal supervision since there are often 
other, less restrictive, means available to achieve such supervision, such as 
with the Mutual Assistance Directive144 or by simply asking the taxpayer.145 
Also the need to ensure recovery of a tax debt may provide for an acceptable 
justification.146 
The safeguarding of effectiveness of fiscal supervision and the need to 
ensure recovery of a tax debt are not capable of justifying the Swedish 
interest deduction limitation rules, as the Swedish rules do not concern 
neither the fiscal supervision of taxpayers, the collection of taxes in cross-
border situations nor the recovery of tax debts. The Swedish rules in 
                                                
140 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, para. 8. 
141 Helminen (n 96), 2013, chapter 2.3.1. 
142 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, para. 8; C-250/95 Futura Participations, para. 31; C-254/97 
Société Baxter, para. 18; C-55/98 Vestergaard, para. 25; C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, para. 
44; joined cases C-155/08 and C-157/08 Passenheim-van Schoot, para. 45; and C-498/10 X 
NV, para. 39. See also Dahlberg (n 124) 2005, p. 124 et seq.. 
143 C-318/10 SIAT, para. 44. 
144 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the 
field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 64/1, 11 March 2011. 
145 C-204/90 Bachmann, paras. 18 and 20; C-254/97 Société Baxter, paras. 17, 19 and 20; 
C-55/98 Vestergaard, para. 26; C-136/00 Danner, paras. 49 and 52; C-422/01 Skandia and 
Ramstedt, paras. 42-45; C-39/04 Laboratoires Fournier, para. 25; C-150/04 Commission v 
Denmark, paras. 52 and 54; C-520/04 Turpeinen, paras. 36 and 37; C-101/05 A, paras. 58 
and 59; C-383/05 Talotta, para. 36; C-451/05 ELISA, paras. 92-96; C-318/07 Persche, 
paras. 53 and 54; C-267/09 Commission v Portugal, paras. 38-46; and C-132/10 Halley, 
para. 36. 
146 C-290/04 Scorpio, para. 35. 
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question aims, instead, to hinder erosion of the Swedish tax base with the 
use of interest. 
3.4.3 The cohesion of the tax system 
The cohesion of the tax system has by the ECJ been accepted as capable of 
justifying a discriminatory and restrictive measure.147 The cohesion of the 
tax system means, in essence, that the positive and negative aspects of the 
taxation of income are inseparable parts of a national tax system.148 In other 
words is the cohesion of the tax system based on symmetry in the taxation 
where a tax advantage given in a tax jurisdiction is conditional upon a later 
taxation of an income with a direct link to that tax advantage in the same tax 
jurisdiction.149 The justification ground in question is, however, rarely 
accepted by the ECJ since its application is limited to certain situations.150 
The tax advantage and the taxation of income must, for a direct link to exist, 
relate to the same taxpayer and the same income.151 For example, the 
taxation of profits of a company and the taxation of dividends received by 
the shareholder of the same company are not considered to have a direct link 
while the tax treatment of a company and its permanent establishment in 
another Member State may have a direct link since the permanent 
establishment is not an independent legal person.152 An exception from the 
requirement of the same taxpayer is if the tax burden and the tax advantage 
relate to the same economic process within a group of companies.153 
Academic writers have different opinions as to whether the cohesion of the 
tax system still can justify a discriminatory or restrictive measure. It has, on 
one hand, been argued that the cohesion of the tax system only can be 
applicable in exceptional situations as it has a strict application and is, 
therefore, useless in practice.154 It has, on the other hand, been argued that 
the cohesion of the tax system recently has grown to be more important.155 
An alternative argument is that the cohesion of the tax system has re-
emerged in the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing rights 
                                                
147 C-204/90 Bachmann, paras. 21-28; and C-300/90 Commission v Belgium, para. 21. 
148 Verdoner, L., The Coherence Principle under EC Tax Law, European Taxation, Vol. 49 
no. 5, 2009, p. 274. 
149 C-107/94 Asscher, paras. 58 and 59; C-136/00 Danner, paras. 36 and 37; C-422/01 
Skandia and Ramstedt, paras. 32-36; C-250/08 Commission v Belgium, paras. 70-82; and 
C-253/09 Commission v Hungary, paras. 70-85. See also van Thiel, S., Justifications in 
Community Law for Income Tax Restrictions on Free movement: Acte Clair Rules That 
Can Be Readily Applied by National Courts – Part 1, European Taxation, 6/2008, p. 280 et 
seq.; and Helminen (n 96), 2013, chapter 2.3.6. 
150 C-251/98 Baars, paras. 38-40; C-80/94 Wielockx, para. 25; C-35/98 Verkooijen, paras. 
56-58; C-168/01 Bosal Holding, paras. 31-34; and C-319/02 Manninen, para. 45. 
151 C-35/98 Verkooijen, para. 57; C-251/98 Baars, para. 40; C-168/01 Bosal Holding, paras. 
29-35; and C-9/02 de Lasteyrie du Saillant, paras. 61-67. See also Verdoner (n 150), 2009, 
p. 281; and Martin, P., The day after tomorrow: The UK system after Marks & Spencer, 13 
Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report 3, 2014. 
152 See cases C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson, para. 18; C-168/01 Bosal Holding, para. 
31; C-315/02 Lenz, paras. 36-39; and C-319/02 Manninen, paras. 44-46; compared to C-
157/07 Krankenheim, para. 44. 
153 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, paras. 43, 49, 51 and 57. See also Helminen (n 96), 2013, 
chapter 2.3.6. 
154 van Thiel (n 151), 6/2008, p. 281. 
155 Dahlberg, M., Internationell Beskattning, 3 ed., Studentliteratur, Lund, 2012, p. 361. 
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between Member States.156 It is, however, clear that the cohesion of the tax 
system still is capable of justifying a discriminatory and restrictive measure 
since the ECJ has, in recent cases, used the justification ground in question 
to justify such a national measure.157 
Either way it must be concluded that the cohesion of the tax system cannot 
justify the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. The justification 
ground in question has a narrow scope and the ECJ has concluded that there 
is no direct link between denied deductions for parent companies and the 
taxations of profits of the subsidiaries, as the parent companies and their 
subsidiaries are different tax subjects.158 There is, thus, no direct link 
between the deduction of interest expenses in the Swedish company (the 
borrower) and the taxation of interest income in the foreign affiliated 
company (the lender), as required for the Swedish rules to be justified.159 
3.4.4 The safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing rights 
between Member States 
The safeguarding of the balanced allocation rights between Member States 
was first accepted as a justification ground by the ECJ in 2005 and has been 
invoked by Member States since.160 Member States may, according to this 
justification ground, impose measures to prevent situations, which put its 
taxing rights at risk concerning activities carried on within the Member 
State.161 A Member State may, thus, have tax measures, which restricts the 
taxpayer from moving profits from the Member State if the Member State 
has a reasonable connection to the taxpayer or the tax object. The 
justification ground permits Member States to restrict taxpayers from being 
able to choose where to tax its profits.162 Worth mentioning is that as with 
the cohesion of the tax system is the safeguarding of the balanced allocation 
of taxing rights between Member States designed to safeguard the symmetry 
between the right to tax profits and the entitlement to deduct losses.163 
It is not clear whether the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing 
rights between Member States can justify a discriminatory and restrictive 
measure on its own, as the ECJ has been inconsistent on the matter. The 
ECJ has, on one hand, in its case law, held that the justification ground in 
                                                
156 Terra, B., & Wattel, P., European Tax Law, 5th ed., Kluwer Law International, 2008, p. 
756. 
157 See C-157/07 Krankenheim, paras. 42 and 43; and C-322/11 K, para. 71. 
158 C-168/01 Bosal Holding, paras. 35 and 36; and C-471/04 Keller Holding, paras. 42 and 
43. 
159 See for this reason C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, para. 42. 
160 It was first accepted in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, paras. 45 and 51. See also C-231/05 
Oy AA, para. 51; C-414/06 Lidl Belgium, para. 33; C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, para. 87; 
C-311/08 SGI, para. 60; and C-337/08 X Holding, para. 33. 
161 C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz, para. 42; C-231/05 Oy AA, para. 54; C-311/08 SGI, para. 
60; and C-318/10 SIAT, para. 45. 
162 C-231/05 Oy AA, para. 55; C-414/06 Lidl Belgium, para. 34; and C-337/08 X Holding, 
para. 31. See also Poulsen, M., Freedom of Establishment and the Balanced Allocation of 
Tax Jurisdiction, Intertax, Vol. 40 issue 3, 2012, p. 203 et seq.; and Hilling, M., Är det 
möjligt att utforma EU-förenliga skatteflyktsregler? – En analys med särskilt fokus på 
rättfärdigandegrunden att upprätthålla den väl avvägda fördelningen av 
beskattningsrätten, Svensk Skattetidning, 2012:9, p. 763 et seq.. 
163 C-231/05 Oy AA, para. 56; C-414/06 Lidl Belgium, para. 34; C-371/10 National Grid 
Indus, para. 80; and C-350/11 Argenta Spaarbank, para. 54. 
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question cannot, alone, justify such a measure and, therefore, needs to be 
applied in conjunction with another justification ground such as the 
prevention of tax avoidance, the need to prevent the double use of losses or 
others.164 The ECJ has, on the other hand, in recent judgments, justified a 
discriminatory and restrictive measure with the justification ground in 
question alone.165 
Regardless of the uncertainty as to whether the safeguarding of the balanced 
allocation of taxing rights between Member States can justify the Swedish 
rules alone have the European Commission and the Swedish Government 
agreed that the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing rights 
between Member States and the prevention of tax avoidance (which will be 
explained and analysed in relation to the Swedish rules below) can justify 
the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules.166 Academic writers have 
also confirmed this, as the aim of the Swedish rules is to hinder erosion of 
the Swedish tax base through interest deductions.167 
It is not obvious that the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing 
rights between Member States can justify the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules. It is true that interest expenses can be used by MNEs to 
shift profits to other tax jurisdictions even though the activities of the MNE, 
which gave rise to the profits in question, were performed in Sweden. The 
safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing rights between Member 
States as a justification ground requires, however, as mentioned above, that 
the discriminatory and restrictive national measure has a symmetry in a 
sense that profits and losses are regarded within the same tax jurisdiction. 
The general principle in all (or at least many) tax jurisdictions that costs are 
deductible insofar as they have incurred for the purpose of acquiring or 
maintaining taxable income is an expression of symmetry regarding the 
relationship between deductible costs and taxable income. This principle is 
generally applicable in the Swedish tax system as well.168 The principle, 
however, does not apply to the relationship between the deduction of 
interest expenses and the taxation of income in the Swedish tax system. 
Interest expenses are, thus, deductible regardless of if the expenses have 
occurred for the purpose of acquiring or maintaining income.169 It can be 
concluded that the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are not based 
on such a symmetry required by the safeguarding of the balanced allocation 
of taxing rights between Member States and can, therefore, not be justified 
on such a basis. 
                                                
164 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, para. 46; C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas, para. 56; C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz, paras. 42 and 44; and C-
231/05 Oy AA, para. 56. 
165 C-337/08 X Holding, para. 33; C-371/10 National Grid Indus, para. 48; and C-164/12 
DMC, para. 46. 
166 See SG-Greffe (2014) D/17633, case no. 2013/4206, 24 November 2014, p. 7; and dnr. 
Fi2014/4205, p. 11-13. 
167 Hilling, M., Är det möjligt att utforma EU-förenliga skatteflyktsregler? – En analys med 
särskilt fokus på EU-domstolen proportionalitetsbedömning, Svensk Skattetidning, 
2012:10, p. 824 et seq.. 
168 Ch. 16, art. 1 1st sentence, SITA. 
169 Ch. 16, art. 1 2nd sentence, SITA. 
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3.4.5 The need to prevent the double use of losses 
The need to prevent double use of losses is a justification ground also 
introduced by the ECJ in 2005 and has been invoked by Member States in 
various subsequent cases.170 This means that a discriminatory and restrictive 
measure can be justified if there is a risk that losses or deductions can be 
used twice in two different tax jurisdictions. Worth mentioning is that the 
ECJ has not clarified whether the need to prevent double use of losses can 
justify a discriminatory and restrictive measure on its own, without other 
justification grounds.171 It is, however, unlikely that the need to prevent 
double use of losses can justify the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules since the interest expenses cannot be deducted in another tax 
jurisdiction. It is the Swedish company that has the interest expenses and 
there is not a risk that they will be deducted in another jurisdiction as well. 
3.4.6 The prevention of tax avoidance 
Taking advantage of the differences in tax systems of Member States is an 
acceptable form of tax planning, to a certain extent. The ECJ has clearly 
stated that direct taxation is not harmonized within the EU and that EU 
nationals, therefore, have the right to choose the most beneficial tax system 
within the EU to perform its activities.172 Member States are, thus, not 
allowed to create measures that are discriminatory or restrictive on the basis 
that the State loses tax revenue or that the tax is lower in other tax 
jurisdictions within the EU.173 
The ECJ has been reluctant to accept the prevention of tax avoidance as a 
justification ground for restrictions on the fundamental freedoms but has, 
lately, been more understanding towards the Member States.174 The ECJ has 
stated that discriminatory and restrictive measures that apply specifically to 
wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, the 
objective of which is to escape the normally tax due, are justified by the 
prevention of tax avoidance.175  
The European Commission and the Swedish Government agree that the 
prevention of tax avoidance can justify the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules. The motivation, however, is different between the parties. 
The European Commission has based its opinion on the fact that the 
                                                
170 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, para. 47. See also cases C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, para. 51; 
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Merallgesellschaft, para. 59; C-136/00 Danner, para. 56; C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, 
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Swedish rules actually hinder artificial arrangements, without consideration 
taken as to whether other situations also are within the scope of the Swedish 
rules. Such consideration is taken by the European Commission in the 
proportionality analysis.176 The Swedish Government has based its opinion 
on the fact that the Swedish rules do not need to be limited to wholly 
artificial arrangements, as ECJ case law has shown that whenever the 
prevention of tax avoidance and the safeguarding of the balanced allocation 
of taxing rights between Member States are applicable together, there is no 
need to limit the justification of the discriminatory and restrictive measure 
to wholly artificial arrangements.177 The Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules do not have the prevention of tax avoidance as a sole 
purpose and, therefore, do not have such a limitation.178 The Swedish 
Government seems to have based its arguments on Swedish academic 
articles.179 
It must be determined, first, whether the Swedish interest deduction 
limitation rules are covered by the requirement of limitation of applicability 
to wholly artificial arrangements and, second, when such an analysis is to be 
conducted if it is shown that the requirement is applicable on the rules. Non-
applicability of the requirement presupposes, according to the Swedish 
Government, that the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing 
rights between Member States is applicable and can justify the Swedish 
rules. As has been shown above is this not the case as the safeguarding of 
the balanced allocation of taxing rights between Member States cannot 
justify the Swedish rules. The requirement that national anti-avoidance 
measures must be limited to wholly artificial arrangements can only be 
disregarded in exceptional cases which concludes that the Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules are covered by the requirement.180 
It must for these reasons be determined when the analysis, whether the 
Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are covered by the requirement 
of a limitation of applicability to wholly artificial arrangements, is to be 
conducted. The ECJ has stated that “in order for a restriction on the freedom 
of establishment to be justified on the ground of prevention of abusive 
practices, the specific objective of such a restriction must be to prevent 
conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do 
not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on 
the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory…”.181 The 
statement do imply that there should be some level of concern regarding 
whether the national measure is limited to wholly artificial arrangements but 
                                                
176 SG-Greffe (2014) D/17633, case no. 2013/4206, 24 November 2014, p. 7. 
177 Dnr. Fi2014/4205, p. 11-13. 
178 The Swedish Government refers to C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, paras. 44-51; C-524/04 
Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, para. 75; C-414/06 Lidl Belgium, para. 
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the ECJ has, in most of its case law, only determined whether wholly 
artificial arrangements are covered by the national measure and later, in the 
proportionality analysis, determined whether also other situations are 
restricted.182  
The proceeding analysis will, thus, determine whether wholly artificial 
arrangements are covered by the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules. 
Whether also other situations are covered by the Swedish rules will be 
determined in the proportionality analysis. The analysis cannot be limited to 
the 10 %-rule only as that would not give a proper result. The effect of the 
Swedish interest deduction limitations rules applied together is to be 
analysed.183 The exception to the 10 %-rule and the business purpose rule 
are specifically of interest when determining whether the Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules cover wholly artificial arrangements. The rules 
hinder arrangements with the purpose of obtaining a substantial tax 
advantage and transactions that are not mainly business motivated. It can, 
therefore, be concluded that the Swedish rules do restrict wholly artificial 
arrangements since the rules hinder MNEs who use interest expenses for the 
purpose of lowering the taxable base in Sweden and increase profit in low-
tax jurisdictions. The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are, thus, 
justified by the prevention of tax avoidance. 
3.4.7 The territoriality principle 
The territoriality principle has been accepted as a justification ground in 
some cases by the ECJ.184 The justification grounds means, in essence, that 
a discriminatory and restrictive measure can be justified if the State, as a 
principle and in symmetry, only taxes income with a sufficient connection 
to the State in question. Also if a State allows deductions only in relation to 
costs having a purpose of acquiring or maintaining income within the 
State.185 The motivation of a justification of the Swedish rules with the 
territoriality principle would be that profits earned in Sweden also should be 
taxed in Sweden. Sweden, as has previously been concluded, however, does 
not apply a symmetrical taxation regarding interest, as interest expenses are 
deductible without a requirement of a purpose of acquiring or maintaining 
income (3.4.3 and 3.4.4). The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules, 
thus, cannot be justified by the territoriality principle. 
3.5 Proportionality 
A national discriminatory and restrictive measure, which has been justified 
by an overriding reason in the public interest, must be proportionate to be 
                                                
182 See the judgment in C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, para. 37 where the ECJ analysed 
whether the national measure were limited to wholly artificial arrangements in the 
justification analysis. This is also argued for in Dahlberg (n 20), 2011, p. 416. See, 
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compatible with the freedom of establishment.186 The ECJ has not applied 
an uniform proportionality test in its case law since two different tests have 
been used. On one hand has the ECJ used a three-step test in which it is 
investigated whether the discriminatory and restrictive, although justified, 
national measure is appropriate to ensure the attainment of its objective, the 
measure is necessary in a sense that no other, less restrictive, measure is 
available and, lastly, if the measure is proportionate to its objective 
(proportionality in a more narrower sense). On the other hand has the ECJ 
used a two-fold test in which it is tested whether the national measure is 
necessary and proportionate, as with the three-step test but without the 
appropriate part of the test. The two-fold test has prevailed in recent case 
law and is applied for the purposes of the proportionality analysis.187 
The proportionality of national measures with the purpose of hindering tax 
avoidance has been the subject of several cases before the ECJ. It is to be 
investigated whether the national measure cover other situations than wholly 
artificial arrangements. The ECJ has stated that this is to be made with 
consideration to both subjective and objective elements where the intention 
of the taxpayer must be to obtain a tax advantage and the lack of physical 
existence of the subsidiary in terms of premises, staff and equipment must 
be ascertainable by third parties.188 The ECJ has also stated that there is a 
wholly artificial arrangement where the interest paid between dependent 
parties, on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence, exceeds what 
would have been agreed upon on an arm´s length basis i.e. the commercial 
terms, which would have been accepted if the parties were independent. The 
national legislation must, thus, be limited to hinder cross-border interest 
payments exceeding arm´s length and only deny deduction of the exceeding 
part of the interest expenses to be proportionate.189  
The ECJ has, further, stated that a national measure is proportionate only if 
the taxpayer, without an excessive administrative burden, is given the 
opportunity to show that there are commercial reasons to the transaction 
other than tax reasons.190 Also that a national measure with the purpose of 
the prevention of tax avoidance must meet the requirements of legal 
certainty in a sense that the rule must be clear, precise and predictable 
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regarding its effects. The rule must make it possible to determine its scope 
and applicability with sufficient precision and certainty.191 
Since the European Commission is of the opinion that the Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules can be justified, it has also analysed whether the 
Swedish rules are proportionate. The European Commission has concluded 
that the Swedish rules are not proportionate and, therefore, incompatible 
with the freedom of establishment. The conclusion is based on the fact that 
the business purpose rule is not limited to wholly artificial arrangements and 
that there is a presumption of tax avoidance on the basis of the level of 
taxation in another Member State in the exception to the 10 %-rule. The 
European Commission, also, relies on the fact that the scope of the Swedish 
rules is not limited to terms and conditions exceeding arm’s length and that 
the rules are not in line with legal certainty. The European Commission 
argues that the denial of deduction of interest expenses in the Swedish rules 
is not dependent on the arm´s length principle and that there is not enough 
information as to how a transaction is to be considered mainly business 
motivated in the business purpose rule, thus, stating that the rules are not 
certain as required. The European Commission argues, in addition, that the 
Swedish rules are not proportionate since the burden of proof of whether a 
transaction is mainly business motivated is with the taxpayer without the 
need of any proof of a suspicion of tax avoidance from the Swedish Tax 
Agency.192 
The Swedish Government, on the other hand, has the opinion that the 
Swedish rules are proportionate and, therefore, compatible with the freedom 
of establishment. The Swedish Government argues that it is proportionate to 
require a specific level of taxation in the State of the receiver as this has 
been accepted by the ECJ regarding the Finnish group contribution rules.193 
It is further stated, as has been stated above, that the requirement that anti-
avoidance rules are limited to cover wholly artificial arrangements is not 
applicable on the Swedish rules since it does not apply when the 
safeguarding of the balanced allocation of taxing rights between Member 
States and the prevention of tax avoidance, in conjunction, can justify a 
national measure. This is also the basis for why the burden of proof does not 
have an effect on the compatibility analysis and why Swedish rules are not 
covered by the requirement of legal certainty as stated by the ECJ. The 
Swedish Government, however, states that if the burden of proof in the 
business purpose rule and the legal certainty aspect still are of relevance, it 
is a general principle in the Swedish tax system that the State has the burden 
of proof regarding taxation of income while the taxpayer has the burden of 
proof regarding deductions and that the Swedish preworks contain 
guidelines as to how the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules, and 
especially the exception to the 10 %-rule and the business purpose rule, are 
to be interpreted.194 
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The European Commission and the Swedish Government clearly have 
different opinions as to whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules are proportionate and compatible with the freedom of establishment. 
As it has been shown that the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of 
taxing rights between Member States cannot justify the Swedish rules will 
the analysis proceed with an investigation of whether the Swedish rules are 
limited to wholly artificial arrangements, if the taxpayer, without an 
excessive administrative burden, is given an opportunity to show that there 
are commercial reasons to the transaction and if the rules are in line with 
legal certainty. 
For a national rule with the purpose of prevention tax avoidance to be 
limited to wholly artificial arrangements it must apply to transactions where 
the interest payments are not at arm´s length and the denial of deduction of 
the interest payment must be limited to that part of the interest payments. 
The Swedish rules, however, apply without consideration to whether the 
commercial terms between the affiliated companies are such that 
independent parties would also accept the terms. Consideration is, instead, 
taken to for example the level of tax in the State of the beneficial owner, if 
financing could have been made with equity and the origin of the capital. 
Although the terms and conditions of the transaction are of relevance are 
those factors not decisive for deduction of the interest expenses. The 
requirement that interest deduction limitation rules are only to apply to 
interest exceeding arm´s length is, thus, not fulfilled.195 
Also, according to the business purpose rule are interest expenses deductible 
if the transaction is mainly business motivated. Sweden changed its 
controlled foreign company (CFC) rules when the ECJ stated that measures 
that allow activities that reflect economic reality are considered as limited to 
wholly artificial arrangements. Sweden changed the rules so they would not 
cover business motivated (“affärsmässigt motiverat” in Swedish) 
establishments. It is a direct translation of the wording of the ECJ (the 
wording is different in English because of language discrepancies). As the 
business purpose rule applies to mainly business motivated transactions 
(italics added) are the Swedish rules not limited to genuine economic 
activities or activities that reflects economic reality. The Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules are, thus, with consideration to the wording of the 
rules and the fact that the rules apply regardless of the arm´s length of the 
transaction, not limited to wholly artificial arrangements.196 
For a national measure with the purpose of hindering tax avoidance to be 
considered proportionate must the taxpayer be given, without excessive 
administrative burden, the opportunity to prove that there are commercial 
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reasons to the transaction under investigation. As it is presumed, in the 
Swedish interest deduction limitation rules and more specifically the 10 %-
rule, that the taxpayer is avoiding tax based on the level of taxation in the 
State of the beneficial owner, is the Swedish Tax Agency relieved from 
showing that the taxpayer is avoiding tax and the burden of proof falls, 
instead, on the taxpayer. The taxpayer is, within a reasonable time period, 
given an opportunity to show that there are commercial reasons to the 
transaction. The ECJ has, however, stated that it is not proportionate to have 
a presumption of tax avoidance, which also covers economically real 
transactions, resulting in that the burden of proof is entirely on the 
taxpayer.197 The Swedish rules have such a presumption and bona fide 
transactions i.e. transactions with a genuine economic purpose are also 
included in the presumption. It can, thus, be concluded that the Swedish 
interest deduction limitation rules do give the taxpayer the opportunity to 
show that the transaction reflects economic reality but that the rules are 
disproportionate since the taxpayer has the burden of proof for deduction 
and that bona fide transactions are covered by the presumption of tax 
avoidance.198 
Lastly, for a national measure to be proportionate it must be in line with the 
principle of legal certainty. The national rule must be certain in a sense that 
it is clear, precise and predictable and that it is possible to determine the 
scope and applicability with sufficient precision. The Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules contain several aspects to be considered when 
determining whether the interest expenses in a transaction are deductible. It 
must, for example, be determined whether the companies are affiliated 
(substantial influence or mainly the same management), who the beneficial 
owner is, the hypothetical level of tax in the State of the beneficial owner, 
how shortfalls of the lender affects the analysis, when and how the origin of 
the lended capital has relevance, what a substantial tax advantage is, 
whether the transaction is mainly business motivated with the considerations 
therein such as the comparison between debt in different jurisdictions and if 
finance instead could have been done with equity. The list of considerations 
can be made longer and the Swedish Government uses terms such as “may 
be considered” and “should be considered”, leaving the taxpayer unknowing 
as to which factors are to be considered for a specific transaction and the 
weight of the factors in the analysis.199 Something that has been identified as 
unclear is the fact that the Swedish rules, further, contain quantitative 
requirements to measure qualitative factors.200 That the Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules are uncertain can be concluded on the basis of the 
abovementioned and is confirmed by the fact that the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court has stated that the Swedish rules in question require 
such extensive investigation and evidence from different parties that the 
rules are not suitable for advanced rulings from the Swedish Council on 
Advance Tax Rulings (see 2.2.4). 
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The question is, however, what degree of uncertainty that is acceptable. The 
ECJ has stated that a Belgian rule, which denied deductions of interest 
expenses related to a loan to a foreign company resident in a State with a tax 
rate appreciably more advantageous than the tax applicable in Belgium, 
unless the taxpayer proved that the transactions were genuine and proper, 
was sufficiently unclear to be considered disproportionate with regard to the 
principle of legal certainty.201 The Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules resemble the Belgian rule as both rules presume tax avoidance on the 
basis of the level of tax in the foreign State. The Swedish exception to the 
10 %-rule denies deduction of interest expenses if the taxpayer has received 
a substantial tax advantage in the foreign State while the Belgian rule denied 
deduction of interest expenses if the taxpayer had received an appreciably 
more advantageous tax treatment in the foreign State. Both rules, further, 
gives the taxpayer the burden of proof as to whether the transaction is 
genuine/proper/mainly business motivated. Even though it did not exist 
guidance to how the Belgian rule was to be interpreted and such guidance 
do exists for the Swedish rules in the preworks, it does not make a decisive 
difference since the preworks to the Swedish rules does not actually give 
useful guidance to the taxpayer, as has been stated above.202 The Swedish 
interest deduction limitation rules are on the basis of the abovementioned 
not in line with the principle of legal certainty. 
It has been argued that a national measure should be considered 
proportionate as long as the taxpayer has the opportunity to prove that there 
are commercial reasons to the transactions, uncertainty is needed for the rule 
to achieve its purpose and the legislature has made everything in its powers 
to make the rule certain without jeopardising the purpose of the rule. It is 
argued that the ECJ, in such a case, should be understanding regarding the 
problems with requirements of genuine economic transactions.203 That 
argument cannot be upheld. The principle of legal certainty would be 
undermined and the uncertainty of the Swedish rules would be justified by 
the fact that the effect of the rules are achieved and that the taxpayer has the 
opportunity to prove that there are commercial reasons to the transaction. 
The fact that the taxpayer is given the opportunity to prove that there are 
commercial reasons to the transaction does not exclude the requirement of 
certainty to the rule as it is a separate requirement. The requirements are 
separate in a sense that the one does not affect the other. A national measure 
is still just as uncertain and accompanied with the negative effects thereof 
independently of whether the taxpayer is given the opportunity to provide 
the Member State with evidence or not. 
The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are, thus, not proportionate 
even though the taxpayer is given the opportunity to show that there are 
commercial reasons to the transaction. This is a result of the fact that it has 
been concluded that the Swedish rules are not limited to wholly artificial 
arrangements in their applicability, there is a presumption of tax avoidance 
and the fact that the rules are not in line with the principle of legal certainty.  
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4 Conclusion 
The aim of the thesis has been to analyse to what extent Member States can 
have anti-avoidance rules limiting interest deduction and more specifically 
whether the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are compatible with 
the fundamental freedoms of EU law. The Swedish rules fall within the 
scope of application of several fundamental freedoms but the analysis is to 
be made in relation to the freedom of establishment. Further, as it has been 
shown that the Swedish rules are indirectly discriminatory and restrictive, 
justified by the prevention of tax avoidance but not proportionate, it can be 
concluded that the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules are 
incompatible with the freedom of establishment. The investigation of the 
European Commission is, thus, well founded and it will be difficult for the 
Swedish Government to prove that the Swedish interest deduction limitation 
rules are compatible with EU law. It is time for Swedish companies, which 
have been denied interest deductions under the current Swedish interest 
deduction limitation rules, to review their options in terms of judicial 
remedy. 
The Swedish Government has three alternatives for EU law compliance. 
The Government can remove the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules 
and, thus, make interest expenses deductible without limitations. This is 
unlikely as it would result in an increased difference in treatment between 
debt and equity and increase tax planning opportunities as seen in the 
“industrivärden-målen” mentioned above (1.1). The Government can 
change the already existing interest deduction limitation rules so the rules 
are limited to wholly artificial arrangements, do not have a presumption of 
tax avoidance and are in line with the principle of legal certainty. This 
requires that the applicability of the business purpose rule is narrowed to 
business motivated transactions and that regard is taken to the arm´s length 
principle when determining whether interest expenses are deductible. The 
rules must also be made clearer in a sense that it is, before a transaction, 
possible to determine whether the interest expenses will be deductible or 
not. This is a reasonable alternative for the Swedish Government. The last 
alternative is that the Swedish Government introduces a new solution to the 
tax avoidance issue in question. There is a proposal for legislation according 
to which interest expenses are deductible with a standard deduction on the 
net financial income per year but it is unlikely that the proposal will be 
adopted by the Swedish Parliament (“Riksdagen” in Swedish).204 As there 
are no other concrete changes proposed it can be expected that there will not 
be any changes of the rules in the near future, why it is reasonable to believe 
that the European Commission will proceed with the infringement 
procedure and eventually bring the matter before the ECJ.
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